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Abstract
At Categories 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the 
definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of 
relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that 
Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension 
of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot 
explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I pro-
pose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not specify different sets of relatives, but 
rather different ways to understand each relative. 
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1 Introduction
Aristotle was not the first philosopher to distinguish relatives from non- 
relative items. Plato, arguably, does in the Sophist at 255c14.1 But Aristotle was 
the first thinker to organise a category scheme and plot in it relatives, along 
* Much of the work for this paper was carried out while working for the NWO-funded project 
The Roots of Deduction. I would like to thank the project director, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, 
as well as audience members at meetings in Groningen and Cambridge. Thanks to Tamer 
Nawar, Emily Thomas, Luca Castagnoli and an anonymous referee for written comments. 
Finally, thanks to David Sedley for always encouraging my work on relatives.
1    Some, famously, deny that Plato distinguishes categories of kinds here, e.g. Brown 1986, Frede 
1992, Leigh 2012. I argued in Duncombe 2012 that, in fact, he does.
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with substance, quantity, quality and the rest. Many later category schemes 
have, one way or another, distinguished a relational category from non-rela-
tional ones.2 Aristotle’s approach is worth looking at in detail to set these later 
approaches in their proper context. Aristotle’s approach is interesting in its own 
right, because he gives us a great deal of detail about what he thinks relatives 
are, the features of relatives and how to distinguish relatives and substances.
Categories 7 begins with a definition of relatives (6a36-7), which I label R1. 
Aristotle explains R1 with examples at 6a36-b14. He then devotes 6b15-8a12, the 
bulk of the chapter, to discussing four characteristics that relatives have. I call 
these the ‘categorical properties’ of relatives. Some relatives have a contrary 
(6b15-19); some relatives have degree (6b19-27); all relatives reciprocate with 
their correlatives (6b28-7b14); and some relatives are simultaneous with their 
correlative (7b15-8a12). Following this survey, Aristotle raises a worry about the 
extensional adequacy of R1. R1 might allow some substances to be relatives (8a13-
28). To rule out this possibility, he introduces a second account, R2 (8a31-2). 
The chapter ends with Aristotle suggesting that the so-called Principle of 
Cognitive Symmetry (PCS) will test whether a relative falls under R2 or not 
(8a35-b21), and with a caution that the investigation may not be complete 
(8b21-24).3
Recent commentators have held that Aristotle tries to solve his extensional 
adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives.4 That is, Aristotle 
rejects R1 in favour of R2, and R2 covers fewer items than R1. In particular, 
R2 does not cover certain problematic items which could be both substances 
and relatives. However, on this reading, it is hard to explain what Aristotle’s 
final account of relatives is. In place of this extensional reading, I propose a 
non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not specify different extensions, but 
rather two different ways of understanding each relative. R1 governs relatives 
when they are schematic, while R2 governs relatives when they are specific. I 
stipulate that a term, including a relative, is schematic when we are indifferent 
to the type and token identities of items covered by that term. A term is spe-
cific when the identity makes a difference. For example, there are two ways to 
understand an expression like ‘a human’. On the one hand, it may simply refer 
to a generic human. In this case, the schematic case, ‘a human has two legs’ 
is true. On the other hand, in the specific case, it may refer to some particular 
2   E.g. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A80/B106; Johansson 1989; Rosenkrantz and Hoffman 1994; 
Chisholm 1996. 
3   Sedley 2002, 327 coins the expression ‘Principle of Cognitive Symmetry’.
4   Ackrill 1963, 102; Mignucci 1986, 107-8; Morales 1994, 266; Bodeus 2001, 129; Sedley 2002, 334; 
Hood 2004, 38; Harari 2011, 535.
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human, or group of humans. Now ‘a human has two legs’ may or may not be 
true. Its truth depends on which human, or group of humans, the subject of 
the sentence picks out. 
Aristotle distinguishes individuals and universals (Cat. 1a20-1b9; 1b15; 
De Interpretatione 17a38-b3; APr. 1, 43a25-43). Thus, Aristotle could articu-
late the distinction between a human, understood as an individual, such as 
Socrates, and the kind human, which is a universal. Nonetheless one and the 
same expression can be used to pick out either an individual or a universal. As 
in the above example, ‘a human’ could pick out some individual human or the 
universal human (cf. Cat. 1b15).5 I disambiguate using the terms ‘schematic’ 
and ‘specific’. In a schematic use of ‘a human’, for example, we take ‘a human’ 
generically. The schematic use would pick out the universal human. A specific 
use of ‘a human’ would pick out an individual or class of individuals, although 
we may not know which individual human or class ‘a human’ refers to. 
This paper argues that the difference between R1 and R2 is that R1 governs 
relatives taken schematically, while R2 governs relatives taken specifically. 
I have three reasons for this. First, if R1 relatives are relatives read schemati-
cally, we can explain why Aristotle says that R1 relatives have one key cate-
gorical property: reciprocation. Secondly, R2 relatives, but not R1 relatives, are 
supposed to obey PCS (8b3-19). My reading explains how PCS differentiates R1 
and R2 relatives. Finally, I show how disambiguation allows Aristotle to avoid 
the extensional adequacy worry.
In Section 2 below, I outline the extensional adequacy worry in more detail, 
some existing approaches to it and the difficulties they encounter. Section 3 
explains and justifies the distinction between schematic and specific readings 
of relatives. Section 4 runs through my argument that R1 relatives are sche-
matic relatives while R2 are relatives read specifically. Section 5 shows how this 
distinction solves Aristotle’s extensional adequacy worry and how my reading 
avoids the difficulties of the existing readings.
5   Singular expressions in Greek, like in English, exhibit this ambiguity: ὁ ἄνθρωπος and 
ἄνθρωπος could indicate either some individual human, or humans in general (see Smyth 
1956, §§1122-6). When Greek uses its indefinite pronoun, as in τις ἄνθρωπος, the expression 
picks out some individual, or some sort of, human. Aristotle, in particular, is sensitive to 
this ambiguity, and feels the need to introduce clarifications (Cat. 1b15). In English, both 
definite and indefinite singular expressions are ambiguous. ‘The human’ and ‘a human’ could 
each refer to an individual human or to the kind human. The plural ‘humans’ is ambiguous 
between a schematic expression (e.g. ‘humans have two legs’) and a plural (e.g. ‘Achilles is 
quicker than many humans’).
 439Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
Phronesis 60 (2015) 436-461
2 The Extensional Inadequacy of R1
At the opening of Categories 7, Aristotle formulates R1 (6a36-b6):6
T1: We call relatives (πρός τι) all such things as are said to be just what 
they are (αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστίν) of or than other things (ἑτέρων) or in some 
other way in relation to something else. For example, what is called larger 
is called what it is than something else (it is called larger than something) 
(οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, τινὸς γὰρ μεῖζον λέγεται); and 
what is double is called what it is of something else (it is called double of 
something). The following too, and their like, are amongst the relatives: 
state, condition, perception, knowledge, position.
Aristotle’s approach to relationality contrasts with ours. We, arguably, begin 
with transitive verbs.7 ‘Eloise loves Abelard’ would be a paradigm relational 
statement. The verb ‘loves’ expresses a relation. We may then try to analyse 
terms for relatives, that is, certain common nouns and adjectives, using rela-
tions. For example, modern linguists and philosophers try to state the condi-
tions for correctly using the common noun ‘lover’ in terms of the verb ‘loves’, 
or the conditions for correct use of a positive adjective, like ‘large’, in terms of 
the comparative adjective ‘larger’.8 T1 shows that Aristotle’s approach is quite 
different. He does not hold that verbs are the basic way to express relationality. 
Instead, Aristotle focuses on relatives such as a larger thing, a double, or a lover 
and asks about the conditions under which these things can be said to apply 
to something:
R1: X is a relative =def X is said to be what it is in relation to some Y and X 
is different to Y.9
Common nouns, including those for relatives, could pick out various things. 
For example ‘a larger thing’ could pick out a mountain. Equally, a mountain 
although not obviously relational, can be characterized as large.10 Kinds, and 
6    Translations of the Categories are taken from Ackrill 1963, unless otherwise noted.
7    I owe this point to a talk given by Terence Parsons in Cambridge, June 2014.
8     This sort of approach is discussed by Wallace 1972, Wheeler 1972, Kitcher 1978 and 
Kennedy 2007.
9    Aristotle does not explicitly call R1 a definition at this point, but does so later on at 8a28.
10    Aristotle’s examples already suggest that what matters is how we understand a relative. 
Aristotle allows both a larger thing to be a relative and sorts of large thing to be relative: 
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their linguistic counterparts such as common nouns, are central to Aristotle’s 
analysis of relativity. This analysis of relativity ultimately leads to an ambiguity 
which I claim Aristotle identifies in Categories 7.
R1 tells us that being said to be what it is in relation to something else is suf-
ficient for being a relative.11 This raises a worry about the extensional adequacy 
of R1 at 8a13-28. R1 seems too permissive. Some secondary substances may be 
relatives. Aristotle’s reasoning, given at 8a25-28, is compressed, but this is one 
way to unpack it:
1. Parts of substances are substances [Premise]12
2. Hand is said to be hand of a body [Premise]
3. A hand of a body is part of a body [Premise]
4. Body is a secondary substance [Premise]
5. Hand is part of a secondary substance [From 2-4]
6. Hand is a substance [From 1 and 5]
7. X is a relative =def X is said to be what it is in relation to some Y and X is 
different to Y [R1]
8. Hand is a relative [From 2 and 7]
9. Hand is a relative and a substance [Conjunction of 6 and 8]13
This reconstruction should not prove controversial.14 Aristotle worries that 
some secondary substances, such as a hand, might conform to R1 and so be 
relatives. Aristotle here considers ‘body’ and ‘hand’ as secondary substances. 
Earlier in the Categories, at 2b29-30, Aristotle indicated that species and gen-
era of primary substances should be considered secondary substances. Thus, 
a primary substance, say, Achilles, has a super-ordinate secondary substance, 
human. In this passage, Aristotle extends this idea to parts. Just as primary 
substances have superordinate secondary substances, so parts of primary 
‘a mountain is called large in relation to something else: the mountain is called large in 
relation to something’ (ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον – πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος, 
6b8-9). 
11    Although Caujolle-Zaslawsky 1980, 188 denies this. She holds that R1 gives only a neces-
sary condition of being a relative, but her position is untenable. R1 is said by Aristotle to 
be a definition, so, at a minimum, Aristotle must intend R1 to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being a relative.
12    Aristotle commits himself to this premise at Cat. 5, 3a29-33. Cf. APr. 1.32, 47a27-28. 
13    A contradiction follows from (9) when we assume that nothing is a substance and a rela-
tive, but even (9) alone would be rejected by Aristotle (8a28-30).
14    It simply makes explicit each inferential step in the line of thought attributed to Aristotle 
in Morales 1994, 259; Bodéüs 2001, 128; Sedley 2002, 326.
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substances have superordinate parts of secondary substances. Achilles’ hand is 
a primary substance, as it is part of a primary substance. A hand (taken generi-
cally) is a secondary substance, as it is part of the secondary substance human. 
That is, Aristotle distinguishes individual and generic parts.15
If hand turns out to be a secondary substance, then this could lead to some 
substances being relatives, which is unacceptable. For the most part, com-
mentators have thought that Aristotle responds by rejecting R1 and replacing 
it with R2, an account of relatives that apparently has a narrower extension 
(Cat. 7, 8a31-2, tr. Ackrill, modified):
T2: Relatives are those things for which being is the same as being some-
how relative to something (τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν).
Or, to rephrase the point:
R2: X is a relative =def being X is the same as being relative to some Y.
Most commentators suppose that R2: is a definition of relatives; has a narrower 
extension than R1; and excludes parts of secondary substances.16 For now, I 
will present R2 according to the traditional reading. I call this the extensional-
ist interpretation, since according to this interpretation R1 and R2 have dif-
ferent extensions. One way to account for the difference in extension stresses 
that R1 refers to how relatives are described, while R2 mentions their ‘being’. 
It may be that Aristotle intends a ‘semantic descent’ from how things can be 
15    To anticipate: although there is a worry about secondary substances, Aristotle is clear that 
primary substances and their parts are not relatives, because they are not said to be of 
something (8a15-20). Aristotle’s point connects to specific and schematic ways of under-
standing these terms (see Section 5 below). Aristotle denies that primary substances are 
said of something: (a) ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται (b) τινός τις ἄνθρωπος (‘for the specific 
human is not said to be some human of something’, 8a16-17). In (a) τις is used adjectivally, 
in attributive position, and tells us that a specific human, a primary substance, is under 
discussion. In (b), Aristotle rightly denies that a specific human is said to be a (τις) human 
of something. In (b) τις is used as an indefinite pronoun. Aristotle’s point is that a primary 
substance, human, taken specifically, is not said to be what it is of something, and this is 
clearly correct. As a human, Achilles is not said to be of something. Contrast this with a 
specific father, like Augustus. As a father, Augustus is said to be of something: Julia, his 
daughter. I develop this thought further (Section 4), and revisit this passage when I have 
done that work (Section 5). 
16    Mignucci 1986, 107-8; Morales 1994, 266; Bodeus 2001, 129; Sedley 2002, 334; Hood 2004, 38; 
Harari 2011, 535.
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described to how things are. Aristotle’s point, on this view, is that more items 
can be described as relatives than are, in fact, relatives. So R2 has a narrower 
extension than R1.17 
On this reading, Aristotle is not simply beginning with a general description 
of the phenomenon under investigation and later discarding the description 
as the investigation concludes with a final definition. On any version of the 
extensionalist reading, Aristotle is pursuing roughly this strategy. The semantic 
descent reading distinctively holds that Aristotle differentiates R1 from R2 pre-
cisely using the shift from how things are described to how things in fact are. 
As such, the semantic descent reading has not found much sympathy amongst 
modern commentators. Because the reading attributes an explicit aware-
ness of the move from how things are described to how they are, the reading 
is untenable unless Aristotle is sensitive to the difference between linguistic 
and non-linguistic sorts of subject, predicate and predication. But it is widely 
though that he is not, at least not in the Categories.18 
Other commentators take an extensional reading, but deny that the use/
mention distinction plays a role in it. They propose a range of ways to distin-
guish R1 and R2 that give the two different extensions, but in each case R2 is 
strictly narrower than R1.19 
According to any version of the extensional reading, some relatives, particu-
larly parts of secondary substances, fall within a wider class, delineated by R1, 
but fall outside the class of strict, R2, relatives. Aristotle appears to explicitly 
say, at 8a33-5, that R2 is strictly narrower than R1. The extensional reading is 
attractive because it provides Aristotle with an excellent response to his exten-
sional adequacy worry. When we move to the strict definition of relatives at 
8a31-2, Aristotle excludes the problematic relatives. In particular, the defini-
tion excludes parts of secondary substances. So, although some substances 
might end up being relatives, loosely speaking, no substance will be a relative 
when we are speaking strictly.
17    Ammonius (in Cat. 77.27-78.17 Busse) and Morales 1994, 260 explain the difference 
in extension this way. Many ancient and modern commentators, named in Sedley 2002, 
332 n. 12, stress semantic descent: Simplicius, in Cat. 198.17 ff. Kalbfleisch; Philoponus, 
in Cat. 108.31-109.31 Busse; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 100.4-20 Busse; Ackrill 1963, 101; Oehler 
1984, 248; Zanatta 1989, 592; Erler 1992, 580. 
18    See Frede 1981; Malcolm 1981, 667; Sedley 2002, 333; Barnes 2007, 115-21. 
19    Mignucci 1986, 107-8; Bodéüs 2001, 129-30; Sedley 2002, 332-3. Possibly also Harari 2011, 535 
who, despite attempting to preserve the unity of the category of relatives, states that R2 
has a narrower scope than R1. This view also had ancient adherents, especially those who 
think R1 is Platonic in some important sense: see Simplicius, in Cat. 159.9-22 Kalbfleisch.
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However, any version of the extensional reading faces a problem. Aristotle 
does not cleave to the R2 notion of relatives in his corpus. Rather, he moves back 
and forth between R1 and R2.20 In particular, Aristotle wavers in the Categories. 
He apparently forgets his second definition in the immediately following 
chapter of the Categories. At Cat. 8, 11a20-23 Aristotle worries that the category 
of quality might contain some relatives, such as states and conditions. He then 
gives an argument (11a23-36) that, although some genera, like knowledge, may 
be relatives, their species, such as grammatical knowledge, are properly speak-
ing not relatives.21 Aristotle intends to defuse the worry about cross-categorical 
items. But if the extensional reading of Categories 7 is correct, Aristotle’s move 
here does not make sense. Aristotle could preserve the integrity of the catego-
ries of quality and relative simply by saying that state, condition and knowl-
edge are relatives according to the loose definition (R1) but not according to 
the later, strict definition (R2). State, condition and knowledge would, strictly 
speaking, just be qualities. 
Aristotle certainly has such a move available to him. Knowledge is said to 
be knowledge of something, so knowledge is an R1 relative (Cat. 8, 11a24-5; 
cf. 6b5). However, knowledge, as a genus, may fail the cognitive symmetry test, 
which distinguishes R1 and R2 relatives (8a35-b21). I will discuss the details of 
this test below, but for now it suffices to say that Aristotle holds that only R2 
relatives are such that if one knows the relative, one knows definitely to what 
it is relative. Any other relative is R1. If we apply this test to generic knowledge, 
we see that it is possible to know what knowledge is (say, a species of belief) 
without knowing definitely what knowledge correlates to, that is, the know-
able (Cat. 7, 6b35-6).22 Thus, generic knowledge fails the cognitive symmetry 
test. Therefore, knowledge could be a relative loosely speaking, but not strictly 
speaking. Aristotle made exactly this sort of move, according to the exten-
sional reading, just a few lines before at 8b19-21, when parts of secondary sub-
stances looked like they might end up being relatives and substances. So why 
does he not make that move with respect to generic knowledge, when generic 
20    In Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b13, Physics 7.3, 246b8, and Topics 6.4, 142a26-31 and 6.8, 
146a36, Aristotle uses the characteristic R2 expression πρός τί πως ἔχειν to describe rela-
tives, but in Metaphysics 5.15, Aristotle’s other official discussion of relatives, they are 
called simply πρός τι. 
21    Scholars often acknowledge that this passage is difficult to make sense of (e.g. Ackrill, 
1963, 108-9), but none press it as an objection to the extensional reading.
22    Knowledge as a species of belief was at least entertained in Aristotle’s philosophical 
milieu. See Meno 98a2-3; Theaetetus 187b-201d (although Plato rejects defining knowledge 
as true belief with the jury example at 201a-c: see Nawar 2013 for discussion).
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knowledge raises the similar threat of being both a relative and a quality? If 
Aristotle had rejected R1 in favour of R2, he could simply invoke R2 to exclude 
problematic states and conditions, such as knowledge, from the relatives.
This ambivalence is not confined to the Categories. When Aristotle writes 
Topics 6.8, he does not appear to know that R2 should be narrower than R1. 
At this point in the Topics, Aristotle is discussing how to test whether a rela-
tive has been correctly defined. He explains at 146b3-4 that ‘for each of the 
relatives (πρός τι), being is the same as being somehow relative to something 
(πρός τί πως ἔχειν)’. This statement first picks out all relatives, using πρός τι, the 
characteristic designation of R1 relatives. But then Aristotle asserts that being 
an R1 relative is the same as being somehow relative to something. This latter 
expression designates R2 relatives (see T2). So Aristotle asserts that being an 
R1 relative is the same as being an R2 relative. At the very least, this entails that 
R1 and R2 co-extend, so R2 is not narrower than R1. Sedley 2002, 345 n. 34 cites 
this as evidence that Topics 6.8 antedates Categories 7. But without any other 
evidence that Topics 6.8 is early, this seems ad hoc. In fact, it is just as likely that 
Aristotle does not intend an extensional difference between his two accounts.
In light of all this, we should perhaps revisit Aristotle’s alleged explicit 
assertion that R2 is narrower than R1 (8a33-5). When we do, we discover that 
Aristotle does not unambiguously say either (a) that there are two definitions 
or (b) the earlier account has a wider extension than the later. After outlin-
ing the extensional adequacy objection, Aristotle says (Cat. 7, 8a32-5, trans. 
Ackrill, modified):
T3: If this [sc. R1] is not adequate, but relatives are those things for which 
being is the same as being somehow relative to something (τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν 
ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν), perhaps something might be said in reply. The 
earlier definition (ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμός) does apply to all relatives, yet this 
is not the same as being relative, namely, things being said to be just what 
they are of other things.
This passage is almost always read as referring to two definitions, a first and 
a second.23 But Aristotle does not actually mention a first and second defini-
tion here. Indeed, he does not unambiguously mention a ‘first’ definition at 
all. Although πρότερος can sometimes mean ‘first’ (πρῶτος), the basic mean-
ing of πρότερος is ‘earlier’. Aristotle could simply be referring to an earlier 
23    Mignucci 1986, 101-7; Morales 1994, 250; Bodéüs 2001, 129; Sedley 2002, 332; Harari 2011, 
535. Ackrill 1963, 101 avoids committing himself by calling the what we find at 8a33-5 a 
‘criterion’. 
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definition. The earlier definition must be the one found at 6a36-7. So if there 
is not a first definition, only an earlier one, it may be that the account given at 
8a31-2 is not a definition at all. Indeed, there is reason to think that Aristotle 
does not intend R2 as a definition. If R2 were a definition, the definiens would 
contain the definiendum.24 It would be uncharitable to attribute to Aristotle 
such an obvious blunder when an alternative interpretation is available. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Aristotle also does not say that the earlier 
definition covers more items than the later account of relatives. He says that 
the earlier definition covers all relatives and that it is not what being relative is. 
But this does not imply that R1 has an extension strictly wider than R2, merely 
that R1’s extension is at least as wide as R2’s. This, of course, leaves open the 
possibility that R1 and R2 co-extend.25 
The extensional reading faces the problem of how to explain why Aristotle 
switches between R2 and R1 and why he says things that entail that R1 and R2 
co-extend. Moreover, there is no ironclad textual reason to think that Aristotle 
holds R2 to be strictly narrower than R1. 
3 Schematic and specific readings of relatives
In Section 2, I explained Aristotle’s worry about the extension of the category 
of relative and showed the limitations of the existing approaches. In this sec-
tion, I will distinguish two ways to understand an item, in particular, a relative: 
schematic and specific. When we understand a relative schematically, we are 
indifferent to type and token identities of the individuals that fall under it; 
when we take it specifically, these identities matter. In Section 4, I argue that 
Aristotle marks this difference with the two different accounts, R1 and R2. 
To see this ambiguity, consider the following statement: 
(F) The father is father of something
24    The circularity of R2 has been recognised since ancient times: Porphyry, in Cat. 123.35-
124.1 Busse; Simplicius, in Cat. 201.34-202.3 Kalbfleisch. Among modern commentators, 
Bodéüs 2001, 129 presses the circularity.
25    Mignucci 1986, 107 misses this point, and asserts that R2 is strictly narrower than R1. 
Ackrill 1963, 101 is more cautious, committing himself only to the claim that ‘whatever 
satisfies the second criterion also satisfies the first’. Cf. Topics 1.5, 101b37-102a31, where 
Aristotle distinguishes ‘definition’ from ‘unique property’. These two have the same 
extension—they pick out all and only items that fall under a term—but definition picks 
out the essence, while ‘unique property’ does not. 
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(F) conforms to R1, so ‘the father’ is a relative. But (F) is ambiguous.26 Suppose 
the ‘something’ in F is replaced out with ‘a son’, to give: 
(Fs) The father is father of a son 
Is (Fs) true? If we understand ‘the father’ specifically – that is, as picking out 
some particular father – then whether (Fs) is true will depend on who the 
father is. If ‘the father’ in (Fs) picks out Laocoön, then (Fs) is true, since he has 
sons, while if ‘the father’ refers to Augustus, whose daughter Julia was an only 
child, (Fs) is false. We might say that on a specific reading of ‘the father’, the 
truth-value of (Fs) depends on who the father in question is. That is, the truth-
value depends on the identity of the father. The truth-value could also depend 
on the type-identity of the father. The father-type ‘father of sons’ will make (Fs) 
true, but the father-type ‘father of daughters’ will make (Fs) false.
Contrast this with a reading of ‘the father’ as indifferent to the identity 
of any father. If we understand ‘the father’ in this schematic way, then (Fs) 
is just false. The father, understood schematically, relates neither to sons nor 
to daughters, but to offspring in general. If we are indifferent to the father’s 
identity, we can know that the father has offspring, but not whether he has 
sons or daughters. We might say that we only describe fathers as fathers, and 
get no further information about them. If we assert that, in general, the father 
is father of sons, there will be many counter-examples to that claim. The same 
is true, with the required changes, for daughters. To make a true, schematic 
claim about fathers, we need to specify an exclusive correlative. In this case, 
the exclusive correlative is ‘offspring’.
The schematic/specific disambiguation of (Fs) differs from two other ways 
to disambiguate (Fs). On the one hand, contrast my disambiguation with scope 
disambiguation. Scope ambiguity is a syntactic ambiguity, while the ambiguity 
I identify is a semantic ambiguity in how we read ‘the father’. Indeed, scope 
ambiguity does not match my ambiguity. If you read (Fs) with the existential 
quantifier having wide scope, then (Fs) means ‘there is a father such that he is 
father of a son’, which is, of course, just true, and does not depend on the iden-
tity of the father in question. With a narrow scope (Fs) means ‘every father is 
father of some son’, which is false. 
26    This way of thinking about relatives, as involving an ambiguity, is foreign to treatments 
of relatives descended from Frege and Russell, who take verbs, not nouns and adjectives, 
as the basis for their analysis. But those who work on propositional attitudes would find 
these ideas familiar: see Quine 1956.
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On the other hand, contrast my disambiguation with Aristotle’s ‘indefi-
nite statements’ (APr. 25a4-5; 26a30-6; 26a39; cf., arguably, De Interpretatione 
17b9).27 Indefinite statements, such as ‘pleasure is good’, do not express a uni-
versal or particular quantifier, so exhibit quantifier ambiguity. Although (Fs) 
does lack a quantifier, the quantifier ambiguity differs from the ambiguity I 
identify. On the specific/schematic disambiguation, (Fs) is ambiguous because 
one of its terms, ‘the father’, is ambiguous, not because the whole statement 
lacks a quantifier. Secondly, Aristotle tends to treat indefinite statements, like 
‘pleasure is good’, as equivalent to particular statements, like ‘some pleasure 
is good’ (APr. 26a36; 26a39). But in the case of (Fs), ‘the father is father of a 
son’ is not equivalent to ‘some father is father of a son’, since the latter could 
be false while the former true. Thus, the schematic/ specific ambiguity differs 
from both scope and quantifier ambiguities. 
In sum, an expression like ‘the father’ is ambiguous. Read schematically, the 
relative has a proper correlative object, to which it relates exclusively. In the 
case of ‘the father’ that correlative is offspring. Read specifically, the relative 
does not have an exclusive correlative. When ‘the father’ is read specifically 
and cashed out as Augustus, ‘Augustus is father of Julia’, ‘Augustus is father of 
some offspring’ and ‘Augustus is father of a daughter’ are all true statements. 
So when read specifically, ‘the father’ does not have one exclusive correlative, 
it has many possible correlatives. What the correlative is depends on who the 
father in question is, because a specific token father or father-type will have all 
sorts of coincidental features, including, for instance, being the father of an 
only daughter. 
Aristotle recognises analogous phenomena in other contexts. At Physics 2.3, 
195a33-b6 (cf. Metaphysics 5.2, 1013b34-1014a6), Aristotle points out that a cause 
can be described in different ways. Aristotle invokes the example of the cause of 
a sculpture. We can specify the cause as a sculptor, Polyclitus, a man or, indeed, 
an animal. One way of specifying the cause, a sculptor, is privileged, because 
we are trying to explain how a sculpture came about. Likewise, we can specify 
the father as a father, Augustus, a man or an animal, but one of these descrip-
tions is privileged when we are trying to say what the exclusive correlative is. 
At Categories 7, 7a31-b9 Aristotle himself applies this thinking to relatives. 
A master of a slave can be specified in various ways: ideally as a master, but 
also as a man or as a biped. A relative is only relative to its proper correlative. 
27    There has been some recent debate over whether the ‘universals used non-universally’ in 
De Interpretatione 17b9 give propositions that have a suppressed quantifier. Ackrill 1963, 
129 argues that they are quantifier ambiguous, while Whitaker 1996, 83-94 and Jones 2010 
deny this. 
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But what counts as a proper correlative depends on how the relative is specified. 
Aristotle appeals to the telling metaphor of ‘stripping away’ (περιαιρουμένων, 
7a32) all the other features of the relative. The metaphor suggests indifference 
to the specific identity of the items covered by, say, ‘the father’. When we are 
indifferent to which father it is, we will always be able to say that the father is 
father of offspring.
A further reason to think that Aristotle can mark out the schematic reading 
is that he has a specialised vocabulary for doing so. We might choose qualifica-
tions like ‘in itself ’ or ‘in general’ to mark out the schematic reading. We might 
say ‘the father, in general, is father of offspring’. This intuition would explain 
why Aristotle uses the qualification τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν for relatives. For example, 
in T1, Aristotle uses τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν to qualify ‘relative’ (πρός τι) and the larger 
(τὸ μεῖζον) respectively. Roughly, ἅπερ ἐστίν means ‘the very things which are’ 
and τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν means ‘that very thing which it is’. Grammatically, they are 
singular and plural forms of the same expression.28 
What philosophical work does this distinctive piece of terminology do? We 
can deduce from Aristotle’s use of the expression in T1 that it specifies that 
a relative, like the larger, is just what it is (τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν) (i.e. larger) than 
something else (6a38). When the larger is described as such, that is, as larger, 
then the larger is larger than something. This already suggests that the quali-
fication tells us to read schematically. When we are indifferent to the identity 
of the items that might fall under the term ‘the larger’, the larger will always 
turn out to be larger than something. This is not true if we take the identity 
into account. Ajax may be larger, since he is larger than other men, say. But, as 
a man, Ajax need not be larger. Ajax could be the only man, indeed the only 
thing, in the universe, and hence a man but not a larger thing. The τοῦθ’ ὅπερ 
ἐστίν qualification keeps the focus on the subject as a larger thing, rather than, 
say, as a man.
This understanding of the qualification is confirmed when Aristotle says, 
at Categories 7, 6b4, that certain terms are of ‘other things’ (ἑτέρων) when they 
are specified as just what they are (τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν) and not when they are 
specified as ‘something else’ (οὐκ ἄλλο τι). He then gives the example of knowl-
edge (ἐπιστήμη). Knowledge, when specified as what it is (i.e. knowledge), is of 
28    In the Categories, this expression is almost always used to mean that we understand rela-
tives in a certain way. In fact it only occurs once outside the context of relatives, at Cat. 
3b36. In that passage, Aristotle points out that substances τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν do not admit of 
a more or less. A man, for example, cannot be more or less a man, in so far as he is a man. 
But the overwhelming use of τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν, or equivalents, in Aristotle is in Categories 7, 
discussing relatives (6a38, 39; 6b4). 
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something else. Knowledge, specified as something else (ἄλλο τι), say, a mental 
state, is not of something else. The τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν qualification focuses on 
taking the relative as the relative it is. That is, taking relatives schematically.29 
4 R1 are Schematic Relatives and R2 are Specific Relatives
Above, I have argued that Aristotle is aware of an ambiguity between two 
ways of reading relatives and has the conceptual resources to navigate it. In 
this section, I argue that R1 is Aristotle taking relatives schematically, while 
Aristotle indicates with R2 that we take relatives specifically. My argument has 
two parts. First, if R1 indicates that relatives are read schematically, then how 
Aristotle characterises R1 relatives is explicable. Secondly, if R2 relatives are 
relatives read specifically, then how PCS follows from R2 and how PCS distin-
guishes R1 and R2 relatives is explicable. Since the non-extensional reading is 
the best available explanation of all these features, we should endorse it. In 
Section 5, I will confirm my reading by showing how Aristotle distinguishes 
relatives from substances in a way that does not face the main problems of the 
extensional reading.
If R1 relatives are relatives read schematically, we can explain Aristotle’s 
careful argumentative moves about reciprocity. At 6b28-36, Aristotle claims 
that each relative has a correlative to which it relates. To take Aristotle’s exam-
ple, the relative slave has a correlative to which it relates, master. Aristotle 
insists that the correlative for each relative also relates to it. So the slave is 
called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave (7b6-7). That 
is, there is a principle of reciprocity such that if a relative relates to a correla-
tive then that correlative relates to the relative. Put more carefully, where X and 
Y are a relative-correlative pair:
REC: If X is relative to Y then Y is relative to X.30
29    Plato also uses ὅπερ ἐστίν in precisely this manner, i.e. to focus on viewing a relative sche-
matically. See, for example, the uses of that expression in Symposium 199e3-4; Theaetetus 
204e11; Sophist 255d7. These passages and other evidence of Plato’s use of ὅπερ ἐστίν are dis-
cussed in Duncombe 2013 which discusses an occurrence at Parmenides 133c8. Although 
controversial, I think that the same idea can be found at Sophist 255c-d. Duncombe 2012 
argues for this in detail. Duncombe forthcoming discusses an occurrence of this expres-
sion at Republic 439a2.
30    To avoid begging any questions, X and Y can range over both relatives taken specifically or 
schematically. ‘X’ could be substituted for ‘slave (in general)’ or the name of a particular 
slave, such as ‘Aesop’.
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REC, as formulated, does not specify the nature of the relation between X 
and Y. In fact, any pair of individuals (this hand and that body) or types (hand 
and body) would satisfy REC, provided some relation or other obtains between 
them.31 Aristotle, it becomes clear, does not intend REC to be so permissive. 
In fact, he only wants REC to be satisfied by relatives that relate exclusively 
to each other. But to ensure that two relatives relate exclusively to each other, 
Aristotle must be taking them schematically, as we will now see.
Aristotle endorses the idea that a relative relates only to its exclusive cor-
relative (7a7-b14):
EXC: If X is relative to Y then X is relative only to Y.
To make EXC true, we need to understand the relatives, X and Y, schematically. 
If we understand X in a specific fashion, then EXC is false. For example, take 
the pair master and slave. By EXC, if master is relative to slave, then master is 
relative only to slave. But, in a specific case, a slave might also be a brother, and 
a slave is also always a human. In that case, the master would also be relative 
to human. This would violate EXC, as master should relate to slave. Only by 
understanding master schematically, that is, with indifference to the particular 
master in question, does master relate only to slave. When master and slave are 
understood schematically, they obey EXC. When we are indifferent to all the 
properties X has, except that X is a master, then the only thing that X can be 
relative to is a slave. EXC follows directly from taking a relative schematically. 
Since only schematic relatives satisfy EXC, only schematic relatives satisfy REC.
A further reason to think that REC applies only to schematic relatives is this. 
Aristotle says at 6b36-7a5 that sometimes a relative will not appear to recip-
rocate because the correlative has not been properly given. For example, he 
says, suppose that we take the relative ‘wing’. This is a relative because a wing 
is always wing of something. But what is the correlative of ‘wing’? Suppose we 
take the plausible candidate, ‘bird’. This would give: (1) ‘wing is relative to bird’. 
(1) tells us that wing relates to bird, but (1), together with REC, should entail: 
(2) ‘bird is relative to wing’. This is because if bird is relative to wing, then, 
by REC, wing is relative to bird. However, (2) causes problems because ‘many 
things that are not birds have wings’ (7a2-3). That is, wing does not relate exclu-
sively to bird, so (2) violates EXC. So, on Aristotle’s view, wing is not relative to 
bird, since it leads to the false, and unacceptable, consequence that bird relates 
31    REC could be captured if we understood X and Y to pick out individuals, using the idea of 
a relation and its converse. For example, Ackrill 1963, 100 takes it as obvious that recipro-
cals are converse relations.
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exclusively to wing. This reductio that Aristotle sketches is only valid if we read 
bird and wing schematically.
If we were to read the relatives bird and wing specifically, (2) could come 
out true, so Aristotle’s reductio would be invalid. Suppose ‘bird’ and ‘wing’ in 
(2) to refer to a particular bird and a particular wing. In that case (2) would be 
true. There are many cases where a bird relates to a wing: too many to count. 
So the fact that Aristotle rejects (2) tells us that he is not reading (2) specifically. 
Otherwise, Aristotle would be rejecting an obvious truth. This suggests that we 
should read X and Y in REC and EXC schematically. Furthermore, Aristotle’s 
reasons for rejecting (2) show that he takes bird and wing to be examples of 
relatives, understood schematically. Saying that ‘many things that are not birds 
have wings’ only refutes (2) if we understand ‘wing’ schematically. Just as, 
when we read ‘father’ generally, its correlative must be ‘offspring’, not ‘son’, so 
too when we read ‘wing’ generally, some sort of winged thing, a bird, cannot be 
the a proper correlative. REC only has the consequences that Aristotle believes 
it does if X and Y are understood schematically. 
In short, Aristotle’s manoeuvring around reciprocity and exclusivity shows 
that here he understands relatives schematically. Hence, Aristotle assumes 
that relatives are schematic when he discusses a principal categorical property 
of relatives. Since categorical properties follow R1, this is good evidence that R1 
relatives are supposed to be relatives read in a schematic way. 
Next, I argue that R2 indicates that we should read relative terms specifically. 
If we understand R2 this way, we can explain the strange features of Aristotle’s 
discussion that follows it. In particular, Aristotle gives an epistemic criterion, 
known as the Principle of Cognitive Symmetry (PCS) at 8a35-b13. R2 relatives 
pass the PCS test (8a35-b15), while R1 relatives fail it (8b15-19). Aristotle’s rea-
sons for these claims are hard to understand, but if the difference between R1 
and R2 is the difference between relatives read schematically and specifically 
we can explain them. This is a good reason for thinking that my interpretation 
is correct. To begin my discussion, we need to look closely at PCS (Cat. 7, 8a35):
T4: It is clear from this [sc. R2] that if someone knows any relative defi-
nitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken 
of (ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως 
εἴσεται).
Aristotle’s principle can be captured by the following conditional. Where X and 
Y are a relative-correlative pair:
PCS: If a knows definitely X then a knows definitely Y
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Aristotle comments on ‘knowing definitely’ at 8b3-15. He illustrates the idea 
with the relative ‘more beautiful’. If I know definitely of a specific thing, say 
Aphrodite, that she is more beautiful, then I must have a special sort of cogni-
tive access to a specific thing than which she is more beautiful.32 Without this, 
I merely know that Aphrodite is more beautiful than something less beauti-
ful. This is exactly the difference between reading the relative, more beautiful, 
schematically and specifically. Read schematically, I may have definite knowl-
edge of the relative more beautiful, for example, by knowing what it takes to 
be beautiful. However, when read schematically, I cannot have definite knowl-
edge of whether Aphrodite is more beautiful, since all I know is that she is 
more beautiful than something or other. Indeed, it may turn out, as Aristotle 
says, that there is nothing that is less beautiful than Aphrodite. But read spe-
cifically, I can know definitely that Aphrodite is more beautiful, since I know 
that there is something less beautiful than her. Knowing definitely, it turns out, 
depends on the specific identities of the things that are less beautiful. 
So how is it that R2 relatives pass the PCS test, according to Aristotle? 
Aristotle explains (Cat. 8b1-5):
T5: For if someone knows of a certain this that it is a relative and being for 
relatives is the same as being somehow related to something, he knows 
that also to which this is somehow related. For if he does not know in 
the least that to which this is somehow relative, neither will he know 
whether it is somehow related to something.
That is to say, for any given R2 relative, knowing that it is a relative entails 
knowing that to which it is relative. At 8b3-7, Aristotle exemplifies his argu-
ment with double. Suppose that (i) double is an R2 relative and (ii) I know 
definitely that a given double, say 4, is double. It follows, according to Aristotle, 
that (iii) I know definitely of what 4 is double. Hence, Aristotle concludes, 
(iv) double passes the PCS test. 
Aristotle’s explanation here has proved difficult to understand.33 Why does 
(iii) follow from (ii)? It seems that I can know, of some number, that it is dou-
ble, without knowing what it is double of. The case is especially clear in the 
case of large even numbers. Suppose double is an R2 relative. Take a large num-
ber like 36,096. I know, indeed, I know definitely, that 36,096 is double, since 
32    Aristotle drops the ‘definitely’ qualification at 8b8, when he first mentions ‘more beauti-
ful’, but it returns at 8b9, so I doubt he intends a difference. 
33    For a range of worries, see Ackrill 1963, 103; Mignucci 1986, 109; Morales 1994, 263; Bodéüs 
2001, 131-2.
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it an even number. However, without calculating the value, I have no inkling 
what number it is double of. It is not the case that simply in virtue of knowing 
definitely that 36,096 is double, I know of what it is double. So it seems that 
double fails the PCS test and turns out not to be an R2 relative, contrary to 
what we supposed. This is why Aristotle’s explanation seems puzzling. But if 
we understand R2 as indicating that we read relatives specifically, we can make 
sense of Aristotle’s move from (ii) to (iii).
First, Aristotle’s use of ‘this’ in T5 suggests that he has a specific reading of 
the relative in mind. If one reads a relative specifically, one picks out a cer-
tain ‘this’ to which the relative applies. Secondly, assuming a specific reading 
of double, what would Aristotle say to the counter-example, i.e. the fact that 
a double like 36,096 shows that (iii) does not follow from (ii)? The obvious 
move would be to admit that although one can know 36,096 is double without 
knowing what of it is double, one cannot know definitely that 36,096 is double 
without knowing of what it is double.34 How does this distinction work? 
We saw above that definite knowledge of the correlative implies that one 
reads the correlative specifically. Since 36,096 is even, I know that 36,096 is 
double. In virtue of this, I know that 36,096 is double of a half. But this is to 
take ‘half ’ schematically. We do not take into account the identity of the items 
that fall under ‘half ’. The result is that I have some cognitive access to the cor-
relative of 36,096. I know that whatever number it is, it must be a half. But I do 
not know what number it is. That is, I do not know the correlative definitely.
If this is correct, Aristotle’s point here depends on taking double and half 
specifically. When we read them that way, double will obey PCS, and we can 
make sense of the explanation that Aristotle gives for why double does obey 
PCS. It follows that R2 relatives are those that are supposed to obey PCS. When 
read schematically, relatives do obey PCS, and for the reason Aristotle gives. 
This is all strong evidence that R2 relatives are relatives taken specifically. 
My second reason to think that R2 relatives are relatives taken specifically is 
Aristotle’s explanation of why a relative like hand, an R1 relative, does not obey 
PCS. Again, this explanation has proved difficult to understand. So difficult, in 
fact, that many scholars think the transmitted text is corrupt. Here is the text 
(Cat. 8b15-21) as it stands in Minio-Paluello 1949, the latest Oxford edition:
34    Ackrill 1963, 102 mentions, but does not endorse this move. He says that, if we endorse 
the move, we owe an explanation of why the same move cannot be made in the case of 
‘hand’: such an explanation is precisely what I have given here. If ‘hand’ is understood 
specifically, then there is no way to know hand definitely. 
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T6: (i) τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν 
οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, (ii) πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται 
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· (iii) τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι 
ὡρισμένως· (iv) ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι· (v) εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός 
τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.
(i) But regarding head and hand and each of this sort of thing which are 
substances, it is possible to know definitely what it is itself, (ii) but not 
necessary (to know definitely) in relation to what it is spoken of. (iii) For 
it is not possible to know definitely to what this head or hand belongs; 
(iv) so that these things would not be among the relatives. (v) If they are 
not among the relatives, it might be true to say that no substance is 
among the relatives. 
Here, Aristotle explains why relatives like hand do not obey PCS and so are not 
R2 relatives. To fail the PCS test, hand should satisfy the antecedent of PCS, but 
not the consequent. That is, the following would be true: (a) I know definitely 
hand; and (b) I do not know definitely the correlative of hand. (iii) should 
entail (b), but (iii) just seems obviously false. If I definitely know a hand, then, 
of course it is not necessary that I know whose hand it is. But Aristotle appar-
ently thinks that it not possible for me to know definitely whose hand it is, 
which seems absurdly strong.35
My reading can explain Aristotle’s meaning here, without altering the trans-
mitted text. (i) and (ii), everyone agrees, amount to Aristotle pointing out that 
head and other such relatives fail PCS. (i) says that head satisfies the anteced-
ent of PCS, while (ii) denies that it satisfies the consequent. (iii) then explains 
35    A popular strategy to evade this crux is to amend the text to include ἀναγκαῖον between 
οὐκ and ἔστιν in (iii). (iii) would then mean (iii′): ‘for it is not necessary to know definitely 
to what this head (αὕτη ἡ κεφαλή) or hand belongs’. Ackrill 1963, 23 and Mignucci 1986, 121 
both take this option. Various earlier translators have read (iii) as (iii′) without emending 
(Apostle 1980, 15; Pelletier 1983, 42; Oehler 1984, 21; Zanatta 1989, 343, cited in Sedley 2002, 
328 n. 5). Sedley points to three problems with this strategy. First, αὕτη, the demonstrative 
pronoun ‘this’, is not Aristotle’s usual locution for picking out an individual. Secondly, 
‘head’ in (iii) is supposed to be a secondary substance; at 8a24-8 parts of secondary sub-
stances were picked out as problematic, but on Ackrill’s emendation, Aristotle has for-
gotten that this is his worry and is saying that we need to know definitely the primary 
substance to which it is related. Thirdly, the correlative of R1 relatives, as Aristotle stresses, 
should not be any old individual or indeed any old secondary substance. Rather it should 
be the proper correlative. In this case, it should be ‘the handed’.
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why head does not satisfy the consequent. The problem is to understand pre-
cisely what Aristotle’s explanation is supposed to be. 
I read the passage this way. (i) says that it is possible to know definitely head. 
Since the extensional adequacy challenge involved secondary substances, 
Aristotle cannot mean head as a primary substance, otherwise the explanation 
would be off target. So head must pick out a secondary substance. But since 
the head is known definitely, it must be a specific sort of head. Suppose that I 
know head definitely and head is taken specifically. Aristotle must, then, mean 
that I can know the general features that a head has, such as, a head is the part 
of the body functionally adapted for ingesting food and protecting the core of 
the central nervous system.36 This is strongly suggested by Aristotle’s remark 
that one can ‘know definitely what it [sc. head] is itself (αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστίν)’. 
That is, one can know definitely the head without knowing definitely the cor-
relative, the headed. Indeed, knowing definitely ‘head’ does not entail knowing 
definitely the correlative of ‘head’.37
(ii) and (iii) explain why knowing definitely the correlative does not fol-
low. Knowing head, taken specifically, does entail that I know head is head of 
the headed. But, as we saw above in the case of more beautiful, this does not 
amount to definite knowledge of the correlative. The correlative, the headed, 
does not tell us anything about specific things that have heads, except that they 
have heads. That is, the headed is schematic. The only information that we get 
from the correlative, the headed, is that items that fall under it have a head. 
When read schematically, the headed does not give us information about the 
identities of those individuals, so Aristotle is completely correct to say that it is 
not possible that we know definitely what the correlative of ‘head’ is, if know-
ing definitely implies knowing a specific correlative.38 
36    Other commentators also take this to be Aristotle’s meaning here: Mignucci 1986, 120; 
Morales 1994, 264; Sedley 2002, 331; Harari 2011, 532.
37    Although knowing definitely the relative does not entail knowing definitely the correla-
tive, knowing definitely the relative does not rule out all cognitive access to the correla-
tive. We could always concoct a definition of the correlative of the form ‘thing correlative 
to such-and-such a relative’, but Aristotle would not count this as definite knowledge of 
the correlative.
38    This explanation does not tell us what to do with the problematic ‘this’ (αὕτη) in (iii). The 
demonstrative pronoun is difficult since it suggests that primary substances are suddenly 
at stake in (iii), while (i) concerns secondary substances. Sedley suggests reading αὐτή, 
‘itself ’ (2002, 330). This makes the text much more comprehensible, as ‘the head itself ’ 
could easily be a way for Aristotle to refer to the secondary substance ‘head’. But such 
adjustments may not be needed. The demonstrative pronoun is regularly anaphoric in 
Greek. So ‘this head’ (αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ) in (iii) could simply pick up ‘the head’ in (i). This 
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On my reading, Aristotle’s reasoning is compressed, but coherent. R1 rela-
tives fail the PCS test because a relative, like head, read schematically can sat-
isfy the antecedent of PCS, but it cannot satisfy the consequent. Schematic 
relatives simply do not contain enough information to allow us to draw any 
definite conclusions about their correlatives. This also explains Aristotle’s puz-
zling remark that it is not possible to know the correlative. Under certain con-
ditions, it is not possible to know the correlative of head, even though I know 
the relative. Those conditions, I have argued, are when the relatives are read 
schematically. Taking R1 relatives as schematic and R2 as specific explains why 
Aristotle thinks R1 relatives fail PCS. It also explains the reasoning Aristotle 
sketches. These are good reasons to think that R1 relatives are schematic, while 
R2 are specific, relatives. 
Finally, if mine is the correct reading, then Aristotle’s peculiar expression, 
‘being is the same as being somehow relative to something’ (τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν 
ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν) at 8a32 should be consistent with a specific use of 
relatives. Take again the simple example of a father. If we exemplify Aristotle’s 
account with a relative, father, we get a statement ‘being a father is the same as 
being somehow relative to something’. At first this seems a false generalisation. 
Suppose we replace ‘somehow relative’ and ‘something’ with ‘larger’ and ‘Ajax’. 
Clearly being a father is not the same as being larger than Ajax. 
However, once we understand that Aristotle intends ‘being is the same as 
being somehow relative to something’ to express a specific understanding 
of the relative, this makes sense. On a specific understanding of a father, the 
‘somehow relative’ and ‘something’ are not placeholders for any relationship 
and any object. Rather they are placeholders only for the specific relationship 
and the specific correlative. In the case of ‘father’ this would be ‘father of ’ and 
‘their offspring’. Being a father is the same as being a father in relation to some 
specific offspring, that father’s offspring. This is both true and what we would 
expect if R2 were intended to indicate that a relative be understood specifically.
would solve the problem in a tidy way, since whatever ‘head’ means in (i) ‘head’ means 
the same in (iii). I want to stress, however, that there is no philological reason to be con-
servative here. Aristotle wrote without diacritics, an apparatus that arose later. Hence 
scholars can add or remove accents and breathings without violating Aristotle’s own text. 
In particular, there is no philological reason to prevent Sedley altering the breathings and 
accents we find in our manuscripts.
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5 Addressing the Extensional Adequacy Worry and Aristotle’s 
Attitude to Relatives
I have now argued, on the basis of Aristotle’s text, that R1 and R2 differ in 
intension not extension. Aristotle distinguishes two different ways to under-
stand each relative: schematically and specifically. It remains for my reading 
to explain how Aristotle could think that this difference in meaning solves the 
extensional adequacy worry he raised at 8a20-27.
Recall that the extensional adequacy worry constituted an argument for 
the unacceptable conclusion that a hand is both a relative and a substance. 
Traditionally, scholars read Aristotle as trying to avoid this conclusion by reject-
ing R1 and replacing it with a definition of a narrower extension. I suggest that 
Aristotle would avoid the conclusion by articulating an ambiguity in prem-
ise (2) of the argument reconstructed in Section 2, namely, ‘hand is said to be 
hand of a body’. This ambiguity is between reading this premise specifically 
and reading it schematically. On one reading, the premise is true, but the argu-
ment is invalid; on the other reading the premise is false, so the argument is 
not sound.
On a specific reading of the relatives hand and body, this premise is true 
but the argument invalid. Taken specifically, ‘hand is said to be hand of a body’ 
means that some specific hand is said to be the hand of something. This is 
no doubt true: my hand is said to be hand of my body, for example. However, 
according to Categories 8a18-21 this entails that my hand is not a relative. 
My specific hand is not a relative: ‘the specific hand is not said to be a specific 
hand of something, but rather hand of something’ (Cat. 7, 8a18-19). Insofar as 
my hand is understood specifically, my hand is not of something, and hence is 
not a relative. Thus, specific items are not relatives and nor are their parts (8a18-
22). But for the argument to be valid, premise 2 cannot rule out that my hand 
is a relative. However, read specifically, premise 2 does, according to Aristotle, 
block hand from being a relative. Hence, on a specific reading of premise 2, the 
extensional adequacy argument is invalid. 
Indeed, even if we take (2) as picking out a specific sort of hand, say, human 
hand, rather than a specific individual hand, the extensional adequacy argu-
ment is invalid, for parallel reasons. A specific sort of hand is a secondary sub-
stance. Aristotle, at 8a22-4, is very clear that secondary substances, as such, are 
not relatives. He points out that the secondary substance human is not said 
to be human of something, nor is ox said to be ox of something, nor is tim-
ber said to be timber of something. Rather, the secondary substance human 
is said to be rational animal; ox is said to be a bovine draft animal and timber 
to be wooden trunks. Only in so far as they are possessions (κτῆμα, 8a24), for 
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example, are secondary substances ‘of something’. Taken in their own right, 
secondary substances are not of something. So secondary substances are not 
relatives. Thus, on any specific reading of (2), hand cannot be a relative, and 
hence the extensional adequacy argument is invalid.
On a schematic reading of ‘hand’ and ‘body’, (2) is false and so the argument 
does not soundly derive the problematic conclusion. Read schematically, hand 
and body should be indifferent to the specific identities of the items that fall 
under them. But ‘hand is hand of a body’, while true of some bodies and hands, 
is not true of other pairs. In fact, as Aristotle went to great lengths to point out 
at 7b15-8a12, the proper correlative for ‘hand’, when read schematically, would 
be ‘handed’.39 So the claim that ‘hand is hand of a body’ is false, when these are 
taken schematically. 
Finally, does my reading avoid the interpretative difficulty which faces the 
extensional reading? If, as the extensional reading claims, Aristotle seeks to 
replace R1 with R2, why does he waver, in the Categories and elsewhere in his 
corpus, between the two conceptions of relatives? For example, at Categories 8, 
11a20-36 Aristotle argues that we should not be concerned about some items, 
such as grammar, apparently falling into both relatives and qualities. The 
extensional reading, as we saw, found this hard to explain. But on my reading, 
it is easy to make sense of Aristotle’s argument. 
Aristotle’s idea is this: (i) in virtue of its genus, ‘grammar’ is a relative; but 
(ii) in virtue of itself, grammar is a quality. (i) holds because, in general, knowl-
edge is knowledge of something. (ii) holds because, in the particular case of 
‘grammar’, grammar is not grammar of something. If I am correct, Aristotle’s 
thought is simple. ‘Knowledge’, read schematically, is knowledge of something 
(the knowable). In virtue of this, knowledge is a relative, in the R1 sense. But 
‘knowledge’, taken specifically, picks out a certain sort of knowledge, say, gram-
mar. In virtue of this, the sort of knowledge, grammar, need not be a relative, 
except in the R2 sense. 
Since R1 and R2 are simply different ways of understanding relatives, 
Aristotle need not select one way of understanding relatives to the exclusion 
of the other. Indeed, from a practical point of view, it makes sense to have both 
conceptions available, depending on the philosophical and dialectical work 
that we need relative terms to do. The only proviso is that we do not overlook 
the ambiguity, which, if I am correct, Aristotle articulates in Categories 7. This 
39    Aristotle does not mention the example of ‘hand and handed’ but, since he mentions 
‘head’ and ‘headed’, this omission surely has no significance. 
 459Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
Phronesis 60 (2015) 436-461
perfectly explains Aristotle’s concluding remark in Categories 8, 11a37-8 that 
there is nothing absurd in counting one item in the relative and the quality 
categories: understood schematically, an item could be a relative, but under-
stood specifically, it need not be. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined Aristotle’s distinction of substance and rela-
tives in Categories 7. The traditional reading holds that R1 and R2, Aristotle’s 
two accounts of relatives, differ in extension. Substances, specifically second-
ary substances, fall outside R2 but within R1. So Aristotle rejects R1 in favour of 
R2. I have argued that this reading does not explain Aristotle’s apparent reaf-
firmation of the R1 conception of relatives elsewhere in the Categories and in 
his corpus. In place of the extensional account, I have argued that R1 and R2 
describe different ways of reading each relative. The categorical properties of 
R1 relatives are explicable if relatives are read schematically. Aristotle’s discus-
sion of PCS is explicable if R2 relatives are relatives read specifically. With this 
ambiguity identified, Aristotle can avoid the unacceptable conclusion that 
some relatives are substances, because the argument for this conclusion does 
not go through.
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